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Abstract: We seek to establish whether a single currency for the entire African 
continent is the best way to achieve the desired level of economic integration. We put 
forward multiple regional currency groups as an alternative scenario to one single 
currency group for the whole continent. Using a genetic optimisation algorithm adapted 
from Ghosh and Wolf (1994) we identify and group African countries with the most 
synchronised business cycles based on a simple macroeconomic model. The more 
synchronised business cycles are between currency group members, the lower the 
combined output loss. We seek to minimise the total output loss for the continent by 
grouping countries with highly synchronised business cycles in the same currency union. 
We compare the five optimal currency area arrangement suggested by the algorithm with 
the Abuja Treaty recommendation of five regional economic communities. Further, the 
paper asks how many currency groups are appropriate for Africa at this time. Based on a 
qualitative analysis we suggest three currency unions for Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
The first goal of this study is to establish whether a single currency for the entire African 
continent is the best way to achieve the desired level of economic integration. We 
propose multiple regional currency groups as an alternative scenario to a single currency 
group for the whole continent.  
We use a genetic optimisation algorithm adapted from Ghosh and Wolf (1994) to 
identify and group African countries into optimal currency areas. The choice of 
groupings is determined by maximising the synchronicity of business cycles based on a 
simple macroeconomic model. The more synchronised business cycles are among 
currency group members, the lower the combined output loss for any given monetary 
policy action. Thus, we seek to minimise the total output loss for the continent by 
grouping countries with highly synchronised business cycles into the same currency 
union. We find that adopting a single currency costs Africa approximately 0.9% of GDP 
each year. This cost is reduced to 0.6% of annual GDP by adding a second currency 
group. Having five currency groups decreases the calculated output cost to 0.4% of 
annual continental GDP. We uncover the country composition of the currency areas for 
different numbers of groups during the exercise. 
We compare the five optimal currency area arrangement suggested by the 
algorithm with the Abuja Treaty recommendation of five regional economic 
communities. The calculated output cost of the Abuja Treaty five currency arrangements 
is 0.84% of annual GDP. This result means that using the optimal arrangement would 
result in a 50% reduction in output losses in comparison. 
Further, the paper asks how many currency groups are appropriate for Africa at 
this time. We observe diminishing returns to additional currency groups. The 
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composition of the currency groups remains fairly consistent as we increase the number 
of currency groups. The impact of the additional groups is that they allow the 
identification of a number of outlier countries that experienced uniquely asymmetric 
shocks that are fundamentally non-economic. Based on qualitative reasons we suggested 
three currency unions for Africa as the optimal number at this time. Then we compare 
this combination with the 5 regional groupings proposed by the AU.  
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2.  Literature Review 
THE AFRICAN UNION AND INTER-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
The African Union, the would-be architect of the African Economic Community (AEC), 
considers RECs in Africa to be the building blocks for continental integration (Economic 
Commission for Africa; African Union, 2006). RECs are regional groupings or inter-
governmental organizations in Africa. Eight1 are officially recognized by the African 
Union. 
Table 1. Composition of Regional Economic Communities 
REC Number of Members Number in Other RECs 
UMA 5 3 
IGAD 8 8 
EAC 3 3 
CEN-SAD 21 21 
COMESA 25 25 
ECCAS 14 13 
CEMAC 6 6 
CEPGL 3 3 
SADC 16 16 
SACU 5 5 
IOC 5 5 
UEMOA 8 8 
ECOWAS 15 13 
MRU 3 3 
Source: Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II, 2006 
 
The African Union has chosen a linear model of integration (McCarthy, 2010) as its 
framework for the development of the AEC (Economic Commission for Africa; African 
                                                 
1 Arab Maghreb Union (UMA), Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD), Common Market 
for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), East African Community (EAC), Economic Community 
of West African States (ECOWAS), Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Inter-
Governmental Authority on Development (IGAD), and Southern African Development Community 
(SADC). 
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Union, 2008) . It consists of six phases, where each successive phase requires 
progressively more synchronicity in the functioning of the economies of the member 
countries. The sixth and final stage of the process involves establishing a continent-wide 
economic and monetary union and thus a currency union to be completed in 2028. 
Some authors have contemplated the creation of currency unions based on the 
existing regional economic communities, for example (Khamfula & Mensteab, 2004) and 
(Masson & Pattillo, 2001) for SADC and ECOWAS respectively to name a few. The 
rationale for using RECs in this manner is in an attempt to build on their accumulated 
knowledge and expertise as well as the successes at integration. Some of these include 
the customs unions already established for groups of countries in West, Central and 
Southern Africa, a common passport in each of the ECOWAS and EAC regions to bolster 
factor mobility, substantial communications infrastructure development in UMA, 
COMESA, ECOWAS and SADC and energy sharing arrangements in SADC (Economic 
Commission for Africa; African Union, 2006). Another important reason is that since 
political and economic considerations are virtually inseparable, any efforts to integrate 
involve political manoeuvring. Using RECs for the initial stages of economic integrations 
takes advantage of the existing political links which would otherwise require more time 
and effort to establish. 
Taken as a whole, Africa has performed poorly economically relative to the rest 
of the world. The benefits of globalisation such as expansion of trade have not been 
realised significantly as can be seen by considering Africa’s declining share of world 
exports that dropped from 4 per cent in 1980 to 1.6 per cent in 2000. The poor 
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performance can be partially attributed to inappropriate inward-looking development 
strategies that capture rents rather than foster growth, obstacles to trades, undemocratic 
politics and tribal and ethnic rooted civil unrest. The formation of the African Union and 
its implementation plan, New Partnership for Africa’s Development were a result of a 
stronger consensus for integration on the continent coinciding with the creation of the 
euro zone. Previous regional monetary integration initiatives in Africa include, in West 
Africa, the West African Monetary Zone (WAMZ) which was to eventually merge with 
WAEMU, the very recently reinvigorated efforts of the EAC in East Africa, and the 
efforts of SADC following SACU in southern Africa (Masson & Pattillo, 2004). 
Using the existing RECs in this manner comes saddled with several problems. 
Most of the countries are members of more than one REC. Some of the challenges that 
arise as a result of this arrangement involve increased cost of membership and the 
accompanying dispersed resources, duplicated efforts, inconsistent objectives and 
conflicting operational mandates at a national level (Economic Commission for Africa; 
African Union, 2006). Awareness of these and other challenges necessitated the on-going 
rationalization efforts, that is, the downsizing of RECs to become more efficient. To meet 
the rationalisation concerns the Abuja Treaty proposed dividing the continent into five 
new RECs, the North African Economic Community (NAEC), West African Economic 
Community (WAEC), East African Economic Community (EAEC), Central African 
Economic Community (CAEC) and the Southern African Economic Community 
(SAEC). This arrangement constitutes one pole of the rationalization continuum, the 
strong form of rationalization. At the other end of the continuum lies the weak form of 
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rationalization where the RECs remain in their original form and their programmes are 
harmonized (Economic Commission for Africa; African Union, 2006).  
Table 2. Abuja Treaty RECs 
   NAEC WAEC EAEC CAEC SAEC 
Algeria Benin Burundi Angola Botswana 
Egypt Burkina Faso Comoros Cameroon Lesotho 
Libya Cape Verde Djibouti Central African Rep. Mozambique 
Mauritania Cote d'Ivoire Eritrea Chad Namibia 
Morocco The Gambia Ethiopia Republic of Congo South Africa 
Tunisia Gambia Kenya DRC Swaziland 
 
Ghana Madagascar Equatorial Guinea Zambia 
 
Guinea Mauritius Gabon Zimbabwe 
 
Guinea Bissau Malawi Sao Tome and Principe 
 
 
Liberia Rwanda 
  
 
Mali Seychelles 
  
 
Niger Somalia 
  
 
Nigeria Sudan 
  
 
Senegal Tanzania 
  
 
Sierra Leone Uganda 
  
  Togo       
Source: Assessing Regional Integration in Africa II, 2006 
 
THE THEORY OF OPTIMUM CURRENCY AREAS 
When a country joins a currency union it is no longer able to change the price of its 
currency or to determine the quantity of it in circulation. Confronted by aggregate 
demand shifts, a currency union is optimal if there is either sufficient wage flexibility or 
labour mobility or a sufficiently centralized budgetary process for smooth transfers 
between countries to allow adjustment to the system (De Grauwe, 1997). The shift in 
aggregate demand from one region to another result in an output decline, additional 
unemployment, a current account deficit and in all likelihood, a budget deficit to finance 
unemployment benefits in the primary region. On the other hand, the latter region faces 
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increased output, a current account surplus and inflationary pressure. If wages are 
flexible, the fall in aggregate demand would result in wage decline, a corresponding 
downward shift of the supply curve and a new equilibrium.  
Another way that adjustment can come about is through migration of workers. 
Mobile labour alleviates the need for wages to fall because domestic workers simply 
relocate to the thriving foreign region thereby avoiding domestic unemployment and 
dampening inflationary pressure in the foreign country (Mundell, 1961).  
In the absence of sufficient wage flexibility, labour mobility or a system of 
transfers, the adjustment problem remains. In this case it can be argued that individual 
currencies would be better, since each country can depreciate its currency accordingly to 
cut real wages and avoid further unemployment.  
It follows that if asymmetric shocks are less likely among a group of countries 
then an exchange rate between them is unnecessary, and the group of countries can reap 
the benefits of currency union, such as growth through increased trade and economies of 
scale due to a larger market (Krugman P. R., 1979). To the extent that the countries 
chosen to be in a currency union still experience asymmetric shocks, however, sufficient 
wage flexibility, labour mobility and a system of transfers would bring about adjustment 
toward equilibrium. 
A section of the literature based on empirical evidence questions the relevance of 
asymmetric shocks, and suggests that the frequency of asymmetric shocks is itself 
endogenous and lower upon formation of the monetary union (EC Commission, 1990). 
An opposing view is argued by Krugman (1991) that regional concentration of industrial 
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activities can be a result of trade integration via economies of scale. In the African 
context, for ECOWAS in particular, Masson and Pattillo (2005) find that terms of trade 
are a particularly important source of shocks for ECOWAS countries whose exports are 
primary commodities. Similarly, Wang et al (2007) note the same asymmetry for the 
Common Monetary Area in Southern Africa based on the differences in commodity 
exports. The establishment of Free Trade Agreements in regional blocs such as SADC 
reduces the incidence of asymmetric shocks from terms of trade differences increasing 
the likelihood of success of monetary union for them. 
Additionally, asymmetric shocks can arise from the fiscal discretion afforded 
member countries when it comes to spending and taxation as well as public nature of 
economic institutions such as the wage bargaining process making this analysis relevant. 
At this time there is no conclusive empirical evidence or theoretical foundation to dismiss 
the importance of asymmetric shocks in the formation of currency areas. 
For a comprehensive discussion of the costs and benefits of monetary unions in 
the African context see ECA and AU (2008) based on De Grauwe (1997). The 
advantages of a common currency depend on the savings of transaction costs which in 
turn depend on the extent of trade among countries. The low extent of trade among 
African countries suggests that the savings of this type will not be substantial (Masson & 
Pattillo, 2004). Studies that suggest that growth of trade can also be brought about 
monetary union imply that the preceding observation is insufficient grounds to abandon 
monetary union initiatives. The benefit will largely accrue from the envisioned stability 
of the new common currency stemming from the associated fiscal discipline. 
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3.  Methodology 
We follow a framework for estimating the cost of relinquishing the exchange rate as a 
tool for economic adjustment adapted from Ghosh and Wolf (G&W) (1994). 
MACROECONOMIC MODEL 
G&W begin by assuming the Cobb-Douglas form for the production function of each 
country where the only factor of production is labour. The output of a given country is 
subject to productivity shocks. We assume nominal wage rigidity, a perfectly competitive 
product market with profit maximizing behaviour and full employment during wage 
setting.  
Assume the occurrence of a negative shock, such as a decline in the aggregate 
demand for a country’s output. The rigidity of the nominal wages means that wages 
cannot fall to bring about adjustment and unemployment must increase. One way of 
avoiding higher unemployment in this scenario is for the monetary authorities to increase 
the price level in the economy above the expected level and reduce real wages using the 
exchange rate. If the central bank depreciates the currency just enough to offset the shock 
and maintain full employment then the output of the economy remains at full 
employment level. 
The central bank of a country with its own currency can behave in the manner 
described above to enable adjustment in the economy. On the other hand, a common 
central bank for a currency union comprising countries that experience asymmetric 
shocks, by nature or magnitude, cannot be as effective for each of its member countries 
because the degree of depreciation of the currency required for full adjustment in each of 
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the economies is different. The common central bank must strike a balance in the level of 
depreciation to serve its entire membership. One way of doing this is to calculate a GDP-
weighted average shock for its members and depreciate the common currency to offset 
the average shock level. All the countries will then be steered toward full employment 
but individually there will be a gap between the output that they could have achieved at 
full employment with an independent central bank and the output they are actually 
attaining as part of the currency union. 
Therefore, for any allocation of countries into currency groups we can calculate 
each country’s output loss emanating from its unique grouping as:  
  
    
   ̂ 
    
    
   (  
   ̅ ) (   )⁄    
 (  (  
   ̅ ) (   )⁄ ) 
Where,   
  is the output of country   at time t,   is the labour share,   
  is the unique shock 
suffered by country   at time t and   ̅ is the GDP-weighted depreciation level of the 
currency union. The total output loss of all countries in the pool represents the loss value 
of a given currency group configuration and it is given by: 
   ∑   
 
 
   
 
A lower total loss suggests a more optimal configuration. Intuitively, countries 
experiencing shocks in a similar fashion will require similar exchange rate policy 
responses. Thus the common central bank actions will be more closely tailored to each 
member’s needs and output losses are minimized. A detailed technical treatment of the 
Ghosh-Wolf framework is presented in Appendix B. 
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Model Caveats 
The mechanism that allows negative productivity shocks to impinge on the output of a 
country relies on the inflexibility of nominal wages. In the CFA zone countries, Rama 
(2000) finds evidence of real wage rigidity in the period from 1985 to 1993. Krishnan et 
al. (1998) observe real wage rigidity in Ethiopia. However, individual country studies 
such as one by Milne and Neizert (1994) on Kenya following negative shocks resulting 
from oil price fluctuation and severe droughts find that the real wage is actually quite 
flexible. Thus there appears to be no overwhelming evidence against wage rigidity in 
Africa. 
An implicit assumption of the G&W framework is that labour is not mobile 
between the countries in a monetary union. In reality, major moves are in progress to 
encourage labour mobility in SADC and ECOWAS to name a few. This presents an 
alternative mechanism for restoring macroeconomic balance. Migration of labour reduces 
the actual cost of monetary union. 
Another criticism that is often levelled at optimum currency area theory is that the 
exchange rate is an ineffective monetary policy tool in diverse economies because it is a 
blunt tool that cannot be applied selectively to different industries or sectors. This means 
that it is not a huge loss upon joining a monetary union. African countries are hardly 
diverse with most relying heavily on one or two sector more-often-than-not natural 
resources and/or agriculture. Therefore joining a currency union certainly sacrifices a 
valuable macroeconomic adjustment tool for most African countries. As such, optimum 
currency area theory insights are relevant if the countries pursue currency union. 
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GENETIC ALGORITHM 
This paper adopts a similar approach to that of Ghosh and Wolf (1994) of solving the 
problem of finding the best currency groupings for African countries based on optimal 
currency area theory using a genetic algorithm. Genetic algorithms are adaptive 
algorithms for finding the global optimum solution for an optimization problem (Cao & 
Wu, 1999). The use of a genetic algorithm is necessary because testing every possible 
combination for all possible numbers of groups would require evaluation of 
                    arrangements. Using a genetic algorithm enables us to zero in on 
the optimal arrangements with about 378 000 evaluations. Time, computation power 
restrictions and efficiency considerations led us to take the genetic optimisation route. 
Implementation of the algorithm is adapted from MATLAB code available in Cao and 
Wu (1999). An example is given in what follows to illustrate the functioning of the 
algorithm. 
Example 
This descriptive example explains what the MATLAB program provided in the appendix 
does on a larger scale. Suppose that our aim is to find the optimal allocation of five 
countries into three currency unions. The optimal allocation is the allocation that 
minimizes the loss function described in section 3.1 and given by equation 15 in the 
appendix. A candidate solution to this problem   assigns each of the five countries into 
one of the three monetary unions. For example, 
   [     ] 
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where the five positions in the vector represent countries A, B, C, D and E respectively. 
This means that for this particular candidate solution countries A and B are in a union 
together, as are D and E and finally country C has its own currency. 
The first task is to create a number of vectors like   where the countries A, B, C, D 
and E are each randomly allocated to one of three currency unions. An example would be 
the first equation below, 
   
[
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
  
  
  ]
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
     
     
      
     
     
     ]
 
 
 
 
 
 ; 
[
 
 
 
 
 
 (  )
 (  )
 (  )
 (  )
 (  )
 (  )]
 
 
 
 
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   ]
 
 
 
 
 
  
P1 is the first population of candidate vectors. Each row of the population matrix 
represents a candidate solution with a randomly generated allocation of the countries into 
three groups. Note that a population does not exhaust all the possible combinations. A 
loss value  (  )         is calculated for each candidate solution using the loss 
function. The best currency grouping for the generation corresponds to the least severe 
loss value, i.e.  , for which (  )     , and it is recorded. Subsequent populations of 
candidate vectors are generated by applying the genetic operators of selection, cross-over 
and mutation which are described below.  
Selection Operator 
The selection stage involves choosing the better candidates of the preceding population to 
be part of the next population probabilistically. The calculated probability that a 
particular candidate solution is selected is inversely proportional to its loss value i.e. the 
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better candidates are more likely to be selected to be part of the new population. A 
proportion of the less desirable candidate solutions, based on their relatively more severe 
loss values are excluded from the subsequent population. They are replaced with an equal 
number of new randomly generated candidate solutions. 
Cross-over Operator 
The cross-over stage creates new candidates using two adjacent candidates from the 
previous population by swapping segments beyond a randomly chosen cross-over point. 
Suppose the two candidates to be mated are    and    given above. Also suppose the 
randomly chosen cross-over point is position 2. 
   [     ] 
   [     ] 
The new candidates   
    and   
    after mating are: 
  
    [     ] 
  
    [     ] 
The newly created candidates replace the original candidates in the subsequent 
population. The procedure is repeated for pairs of adjacent candidates (rows) in the 
population matrix. 
Mutation Operator 
At this stage each candidate is probabilistically perturbed by randomly changing the 
currency group of a randomly chosen country in the original candidate solution. For 
instance, with a probability of, say, 0.05 we perform the following. We generate a 
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random number between 1 and the total number of countries e.g. 4. What this means is 
that we will change the currency group of the country in position 4. We also generate a 
random number between 1 and the number of currency groups that we want e.g. 2. 
Supposing the country in position 4 was initially in currency group 1, we would then 
move it to group 2. 
  
       [     ] 
  
      [     ] 
Taken together, the genetic operators are employed to introduce systematic, 
controlled variation into the population of candidates. The algorithm mimics the actual 
process of evolution in nature.  
After the application of the mutation operator we obtain the new population of 
candidate vectors. As before, loss values are calculated for each candidate and the best 
candidate of the generation is discovered and recorded. For continuity, we include the 
previous best candidate as a candidate in each subsequent population so that a different 
generational best candidate necessarily implies an improved currency grouping. The 
composition of the running optimal candidates is only tweaked gradually to preserve the 
desirable links and at the same time explore the possibilities for adjustment cautiously. 
In a global sense, the running best candidate is noted and updated only if the 
current generational best candidate is better i.e. has a less severe loss value. The cycle of 
selection, cross-over and mutation is repeated as the running best candidate converges to 
the optimal currency groupings. The optimization criteria employed are two-fold. We 
terminate the cycle if the running best candidate is stable i.e. unchanged for a 
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predetermined number of cycles even after increasing the probability of cross-over and 
mutation. 
 
The interested reader can find a similar yet more detailed explanation of the 
genetic operators and their implementation in MATLAB in Cao & Wu (1999). 
 
In addition to employing the same algorithm as in the current study on various regions of 
the world, Ghosh and Wolf (1994) also investigate impact of imposing the condition of 
contiguity for each currency area. For a currency union to be contiguous, each member 
country must share a geographical border with at least one other country also in the 
union. This feature is very relevant because shared borders can be logically expected to 
increase the incidence and extent of trade between countries and will likely be greatly 
influential in real-world policy-making.  
The requirement of contiguity means that economic agents in any one of the 
member countries have access to any the other member countries geographically by 
navigating through other member countries. That is, they can be guaranteed, 
theoretically, hassle-free passage to anywhere in the union. 
Generate 
Initial 
Population
Evaluate 
Loss 
Values
Are 
Optimisation 
Criteria Met?
yes
Best 
Individuals
No
in Selection Translate
Cross-over out
Mutation
Generating a new 
population
Figure 1:           Illustration of Genetic Optimisation Algorithm
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While the concept of restricting the possible monetary union allocations is quite 
straightforward conceptually, its translation into the algorithm is much more intricate. In 
brief, the algorithm requires crucial adjustment at four key points to incorporate 
contiguity. Firstly, the random generation of candidate solutions at the outset of the 
algorithm will take considerably more time and finesse to execute because we have to 
ensure that each candidate solution generated satisfies the contiguity condition. The same 
checks have to be implemented after each implementation of the genetic operators of 
selection, mutation and crossover.  
Considerable progress has been made at the time of writing regarding the 
MATLAB code to improve the algorithm to incorporate the contiguity dimension. It has 
been provided in the appendix and it illustrates the convolution of the exercise. A follow-
up study that incorporates this feature among the many other recommendations can be 
expected are in the works. One might say that shared borders are one, albeit very 
important, factor representing existing ties between subsets of countries. The impact of 
shared colonial history or REC membership can be incorporated into the study and 
capture a highly similar, possibly more relevant, yet less permanent effect. 
DATA 
The data used in this study are annual constant 2005 US dollar Gross Domestic Product 
at market prices for the fifty-four African countries. The data are expressed in logarithmic 
form to dampen their variability. The sample period is from 1970 to 2009. The choice of 
sample period is based on availability of data. The data were provided by the United 
Nations Statistics Division. 
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We use the Hodrick-Prescott filter to decompose the log (GDP) series into the 
sum of a slow moving secular trend and a transitory deviation from it which we refer to 
as the business cycle. We use the deviation at a given point in time as the shock that the 
economy suffers. The decomposition of the logged output series into a growth and a 
cyclical component assumes that the series does not contain any seasonality. 
Additionally, the cyclical component is not separated from any irregular movements 
resulting in error in the measurement of the cycle. Also, by assuming a constant value for 
lambda in the detrending procedure the HP filter implicitly assumes that the relative 
variances of demand and supply disturbances to output are time-invariant making them 
indistinguishable to the HP filter (Razzak & Dennis, 1995). 
 
An alternative to the Hodrick-Prescott filter would be to extract the shocks to real output 
the study would use a three-step procedure employed by (Wang, Masha, Shirono, & 
Harris, 2007) for comparison with the current use of deviations of the actual series from 
the HP filtered version. First, a unit root (Augmented Dickey Fuller) test would be carried 
out on the time series data of the natural log of per capita real GDP of the countries in a 
candidate currency area for the sample period. If the data are found to be integrated of 
order 1 (I(1)), the next step would use data of first differences selected based on lag tests. 
The next step would be to extract the underlying disturbances or shocks from the data by 
regressing on the lagged first differences of the per capita GDP data. However, the 
automated design of the algorithm is not easily adaptable at this stage to incorporate the 
full procedure. 
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The Blanchard-Quah decomposition methodology that would be appropriate because it 
uses two series per given country to identify two structural shocks, a permanent supply 
shock and a temporary demand shock in the framework of Vector Autoregression (VAR) 
(Blanchard & Quah, 1989). However, this is not feasible in our study because the only 
complete data for all African countries that we could find was GDP data. 
We assume the labour share in the economy of each country to be constant at two-
thirds. 
4.  Empirical Results 
GENETIC ALGORITHM OUTPUT 
Figure 1 below plots the percentage of GDP loss values of the optimal currency 
configurations for various numbers of currency groupings obtained from the genetic 
algorithm. Note that the marginal benefit of an additional currency group appears to 
decrease progressively as the total number of currency groups increases. Each additional 
currency yields smaller and smaller improvement in terms of output losses. Thus, there 
are diminishing returns to currency groups. The cause of diminishing marginal returns 
stems from the limited asymmetry of shocks that the member countries experience. The 
addition of a currency group reduces the overall asymmetry of shocks. Subsequent 
addition of currency groups have less asymmetry to mitigate. 
With fifty-four separate currencies the loss from forgone macroeconomic 
stabilization is zero by design. Adopting a single currency, on the other hand costs Africa 
approximately 0.9% of GDP each year. From Figure 1 we observe that the largest 
marginal benefit of a single currency is observed when we add a second currency. A 
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saving of approximately 0.3% of the continental GDP is made by this action. Having five 
currency groups instead decreases output losses by 0.5% of continental GDP. To achieve 
a further 0.5% decrease in output losses would require an additional forty-nine currency 
groups. 
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Figure 2: Plot of Output Losses vs. Number of Currency Groups for 1970 to 2009 
 
 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 31 
 
Figure 3: Plot of Output Losses vs. Number of Currency Groups for 2000 to 2009
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The sample period spans over forty years from 1970 to 2009. While this might be 
considered to be quite long for such a study because the nature of the shocks faced by the 
economies of the countries could have changed dramatically over time as well as the 
structure of the economies themselves, using the entire period maintains a level of 
objectivity because the selection of a sub-period that meets certain conditions such as 
relative peace can easily degenerate into a subjective exercise. However, in this study we 
have also run the algorithm on a data set of the most recent ten year of data available, that 
is, from 2000 to 2009. The results are plotted in figure 4 below and discussed thereafter. 
Several insights can be gleaned from an analysis of the optimal country groupings 
provided in Appendix A. We take a closer look at the optimal country groups indicated 
by the genetic algorithms for different total numbers of currency groups.  
We analyse the optimum currency groups by considering the countries that 
progressively get excluded from the larger blocs as we increase the number of currency 
groups (see Table 2 below). What the genetic algorithm essentially does is to provide a 
business cycle dissonance ordering i.e. countries with the most uniquely uncorrelated 
business cycles over the entire period are singled out earliest as we increase the number 
of groups. For larger numbers of groups, where the marginal benefits of an additional 
currency is negligible, a prohibitively large number of runs of the algorithm is required to 
pinpoint the absolute optimal arrangement. As a result we observe shifting of countries 
between the major groups for an additional currency group. 
From the union of all countries where we have only one currency for the whole 
continent to two currency groups, Liberia is left out on its own in the optimal solution. 
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Prematurely looking forward to scenarios of more currencies we also observe that the 
recommendation that Liberia maintain its own currency is a recurring feature. We 
consider the reason for this below. 
Adding an additional currency for a total of three currencies breaks up the major 
bloc from the two currency arrangement into two roughly equal sized portions. Another 
increment to four currency groups gives rise to another splinter of countries consisting of 
Chad, Gabon and Swaziland. 
Proceeding in the manner described above, a pattern emerges as we increase the 
number of currency groups that are possible on the continent. While a few of the 
countries move between the major three or four currency blocs, presumably adjusting to 
harness the increased flexibility afforded by the additional currency and minimize output 
loss, a subset of countries are systematically gradually excluded from these blocs 
individually or in small groups of two. These countries are deemed to have business 
cycles so uncorrelated to any of the major blocs that the continent is better off when they 
manage their own individual or sub-group exchange rates. We conclude that these 
countries fall outside any blocs owing to domestic political problems and civil war, so 
economic factors are not governing business cycles or the generation of shocks. 
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No. of Groups
 
Sub-groups and Individual Countries
 
2
 
Liberia
 
     3 Liberia   
    4 Liberia Chad 
    
  
Gabon
 
        Swaziland   
   5 Liberia Chad Eq. Guinea 
   
  
Gabon
 
Eritrea
 
       Swaziland Ethiopia 
   6 Liberia Chad Eritrea 
       Gabon Ethiopia   
  7 Liberia Chad Eritrea Eq. Guinea 
  
  
Gabon
 
Ethiopia
 
Rwanda
 
      Swaziland       
 8 Liberia Chad Eritrea Eq. Guinea Sierra Leone 
     Gabon Ethiopia Rwanda     
9
 
Liberia
 
Chad
 
Eritrea
 
Eq. Guinea
 
Sierra Leone
 
Angola
 
    Gabon Ethiopia Rwanda   DRC 
10
 
Liberia
 
Chad
 
Eritrea
 
Eq. Guinea
 
Sierra Leone
 
Angola
 
    Gabon Ethiopia Rwanda   DRC 
Table 3: Outliers 
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No. of Groups
 
Sub-groups and Individual Countries
 
2
 - 
   3 Chad 
 
  
 
Eq. Guinea
 
 
  
 
Sierra Leone
 
 
  4 Chad Liberia 
  
 
Eq. Guinea
 
   5 Chad Liberia 
 
 
 
Eq. Guinea
 
  
 6 Eq. Guinea Liberia Chad 
 
   
Nigeria
 
 
7
 
Eq. Guinea
 
Liberia
 
Chad
 
 
  
 
Nigeria
 
 
8
 
Eq. Guinea
 
Liberia
 
Chad
 
Nigeria
 
9
 
Eq. Guinea
 
Liberia
 
Chad
 
 
 
10
 
Eq. Guinea
 
Liberia
 
Chad
 
Nigeria
 
Table 4: Outliers for 2000  to 2009       
 
The genetic algorithm is applied in the study primarily to identify the optimal 
groupings of countries for each number of currency groups from one to fifty-four 
(trivial). The interpretation of the table of outliers given above is used merely as a way of 
making sense of the model output. It does not imply that the status quo or starting point 
for the analysis is a single currency for the entire continent.  
The reasoning from either perspective also results in the same relationship 
between the number of currency groups and the loss value in the context of this 
investigation. Consider a policy maker looking to reduce the total number of currencies in 
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Africa from fifty-four, the status quo, to fifty-three with the lowest possible output loss. 
This is achieved by taking the two countries with the greatest symmetry in shocks and 
forming a currency union between them. To reduce the number of currencies on the 
continent even further, countries or country groups are progressively united to share a 
common currency if they have the greatest symmetry of shocks. Therefore the curve 
starts out from the left with a low gradient because countries with highly similar shock 
structures are joined but progressively, subsets of countries with less and less symmetry 
of shocks have to be united to reduce the total number of currencies resulting in larger 
and larger output losses. As a result we observe larger output losses when we have very 
few currencies and reduce the total number by one. The graph of output loss versus 
number of currency unions that would emerge is identical to the one obtained in the 
current study empirically regardless of whether the starting point is one or the maximum 
number of currencies.  
We casually observe that the countries that are isolated by the algorithm using 40 
years’ worth of annual log (GDP) data seem to be country that have experienced strife of 
one form or the other for very large periods in the sample. We further speculate that the 
underlying source of dissonance of the business cycles of the countries given in Table 2 
above is, in fact, the prevalence of strife for sustained periods in the sample. We infer that 
the currency groups that emerge containing these countries do not reflect their underlying 
fundamental economic structures but are the result of social and political shocks, thus 
they should all be allowed to keep their own currency until they are stable enough to join 
of the other optimum currency areas. Admittedly, the analysis given above is hardly 
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rigorous. To mention a few, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Rwanda, 
Ethiopia, Eritrea, Equatorial Guinea, Chad, Liberia, Sierra Leone have all experienced at 
least one of coup d’états, civil war, alleged dictatorship or genocide. Political strife is 
fairly commonplace in the history of most African countries. The isolated countries seem 
to have experienced political trouble for larger periods in the dataset. 
Model Recommended Currency Groups 
The main limitation of the G&W framework is that it only focuses on minimising losses 
and ignores gains. Reason being that an additional currency will al ays give rise to an 
improvement. If minimizing losses were the only criterion then the optimal number of 
currencies would be fifty-four, a separate currency for each country. Currency unions 
provide gains through increased trade and economies of scale due to a larger market 
among other things. The optimal number of currencies can be rigorously determined 
through marginal analysis. The number of currency groups should only be increased as 
long as the marginal benefit of doing so exceeds the marginal cost. The marginal benefits 
of currency union are not explicitly modelled or assessed in the analysis in the current 
study. This deficiency reduces the capacity of the model and the algorithm to make 
definitive recommendations regarding the number of currency unions that are optimal for 
Africa. However, to the extent that asymmetrical shocks are detrimental to the well-
functioning of currency unions, the methodology alerts us to the pattern of country 
groupings based on the correlation of their business cycles. 
However, based on the optimal group patterns that emerge as we increase the number of 
currency groups we can make a few tentative recommendations. We begin by noting on 
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figure 1 that the marginal cost in terms of forgone macroeconomic stabilization in 
moving from sixteen to fifteen currencies is negligible relative to a corresponding 
increase from, say, one to two currency groups for Africa. We mark this as the ceiling of 
the number of currency groups in consideration. We also notice that three or four 
groupings emerge after excluding the politically fragile countries. One or two countries, 
Tunisia and The Gambia, move back and forth between two of the groups a phenomenon 
which can be attributed to sampling error. We present the groups below as the 
recommended groups for currency unions in Africa. 
 
The map below illustrates the recommended groups geographically. The countries 
shaded grey are the ones that exhibit particularly uniquely uncorrelated business cycles 
likely due to their extreme political instability during the period and are not included in 
any of the currency groups. 
1 Namibia Zanzibar Egypt Ghana Sao Tome and Principe
Burundi Nigeria 2 The Gambia Kenya Togo
Djibouti Senegal Algeria South Africa Lesotho
Guinea Bissau Somalia Benin Tunisia Libya
Guinea Sudan Botswana Zimbabwe Madagascar
Mali Swaziland Cameroon 3 Malawi
Mauritania Tanzania Cape Verde Burkina Faso Mozambique
Mauritius Uganda Comoros Central African Republic Niger
Morocco Zambia Republic of Congo Cote d'Ivoire Seychelles
Table 4: Model Recommended Currency Groups
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Figure 4: Illustration of Model Recommended Groups 
 
Model Recommended Currency Groups vs. Merger and Absorption Currency 
unions 
The Merger and Absorption rationalization scenario has five RECs namely, SAEC, 
EAEC, WAEC, CAEC and NAEC mainly based on geographic location. 
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Figure 5: Illustration of African Union recommended Groups 
Evaluating the potential of this arrangement using the framework of the current study 
reveals output losses of -0.8447% of continental GDP. The optimal grouping derived 
from the genetic algorithm incurs output losses of -0.4186% continental GDP. There is a 
more than 50% reduction in output losses from employing the recommended arrangement 
from genetic optimization. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 41 
This study implicitly tests for a correlation between shocks and geographical proximity 
between countries. By comparing the optimal groups obtained with the geographically 
inclined Abuja Treaty regional economic communities we see the degree to which 
neighbouring countries are allocated to the same currency groups. There is limited 
evidence for geographic symmetry of shocks. In SAEC, South Africa, Botswana and 
Zimbabwe are grouped together whilst in WAEC, Mali, Senegal, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea 
and Nigeria maintain common membership. The fact that South Africa is not grouped 
with the other Common Monetary Area members, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland in 
the optimal grouping based on correlation of business cycles confirms the findings of 
Wang et al (2007). 
Model Recommended Currency Groups vs. Rooted Communities 
We focus our analysis on rooted communities as defined by the Economic Commission 
for Africa (Economic Commission for Africa; African Union, 2006). These are ECCAS, 
ECOWAS, SADC, COMESA and CENSAD. COMESA and SADC members are most 
represented in group one and least represented in group two. CENSAD members are 
comparatively most represented in group three closely followed by group one. ECOWAS 
members feature most prominently in group three.  
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5.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
The first lesson learned from employing the Ghosh and Wolf (G&W) 
methodology to examine optimal currency areas in Africa is that the basic methodology 
is somewhat limited by focusing only on minimizing an output loss function and ignoring 
the maximization of benefits from alternative country combination, including the 
contiguity of currency union members. Incorporating the benefits of currency union 
would augment the findings of this study greatly. Nonetheless, the approach identifies the 
decreasing marginal losses as more currency areas are added and allows the analyst to 
strategically identify an optimal number of currency areas. 
We find that adopting a single currency costs Africa approximately 0.9% of GDP 
each year. This cost is reduced to 0.6% of annual GDP by adding a second currency 
group. Having five currency groups decreases the calculated output cost to 0.4% of 
annual continental GDP. We uncover the country composition of the currency areas for 
different numbers of groups during the exercise. 
Our methodology also allowed us to identify a number of countries that do not 
appear ready to join any OCA. These outlier countries (noted in Table 3) did not 
synchronize with any larger blocks of countries, mainly because their economies were 
still driven more by noneconomic shocks. 
Based on the G&W output loss minimising model and some qualitative analysis, 
we suggest that Africa would currently be better off with three regional currency areas 
rather than one continental currency. We agree that beginning with multiple regional 
OCAs would be superior to trying to establish a single currency area for the continent at 
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once. Using the G&W approach, we also found that 3 currency areas would be 
appropriate and appear superior to the 5 currency areas proposed by the AU. The 
calculated output cost of the Abuja Treaty’s five currency arrangements is 0.84% of 
annual GDP. This result means that using the optimal arrangement would result in a 50% 
reduction in output losses in comparison.  
We believe that this methodology provides a good starting point for identification 
of OCAs, and can further be enhanced by using the permanent and temporary shocks 
obtained using the Blanchard-Quah decomposition to separate out supply and demand 
shocks respectively.2 Additionally, other variables, such as real money balances, might 
be used to identify the level of synchronicity among economies. Running the algorithm 
on such a variable would confirm if the identified currency groups in this study remain 
appropriate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2It was not possible to use this method because of lack of employment data for many of 
the countries for the sample period. 
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6. Appendix 
APPENDIX A: OPTIMAL CURRENCY GROUPS 
 
 
 
 
1 Cape Verde Ethiopia Madagascar Rwanda Togo
Liberia CAR Gabon Malawi South Africa Tunisia
2 Cote d'Ivoire Chad Mali Senegal Uganda
Algeria Comoros The Gambia Mauritania Seychelles Zambia
Angola Congo Ghana Mauritius Sierra Leone Zanzibar
Benin Djibouti Guinea Bissau Morocco Somalia Zimbabwe
Botswana DRC Guinea Mozambique Sao Tome and Principe
Burkina Faso Egypt Kenya Namibia Sudan
Burundi Equatorial Guinea Lesotho Niger Swaziland
Cameroon Eritrea Libya Nigeria Tanzania
1 Eritrea Burundi Guinea Mozambique Swaziland
Liberia Ethiopia CAR Kenya Namibia Tanzania
2 Niger Chad Lesotho Nigeria Togo
Benin Rwanda Cote d'Ivoire Libya South Africa Tunisia
Cameroon Zimbabwe Djibouti Madagascar Senegal Uganda
Cape Verde 3 DRC Malawi Seychelles Zambia
Comoros Algeria Gabon Mali Sierra Leone Zanzibar
Congo Angola The Gambia Mauritania Somalia
Egypt Botswana Ghana Mauritius Sao Tome and Principe
Equatorial Guinea Burkina Faso Guinea Bissau Morocco Sudan
Table 1: Two Currency Groups
Table 2: Three Currency Groups
1 Congo Zimbabwe Kenya 4 Togo
Liberia DRC 3 Lesotho Namibia Tunisia
2 Egypt Burkina Faso Libya Niger Uganda
Algeria Equatorial Guinea Burundi Madagascar Nigeria Zambia
Angola Eritrea CAR Malawi Seychelles Zanzibar
Benin Ethiopia Cote d'Ivoire Mali Sierra Leone 5
Botswana The Gambia Djibouti Mauritania Somalia Chad
Cameroon Rwanda Ghana Mauritius Sao Tome and Principe Gabon
Cape Verde South Africa Guinea Bissau Morocco Sudan Swaziland
Comoros Senegal Guinea Mozambique Tanzania
1 Congo Zambia Kenya Namibia Zanzibar
Liberia Djibouti Zimbabwe Lesotho Niger 4
2 DRC 3 Libya Nigeria Chad
Algeria Egypt Burkina Faso Madagascar Seychelles Gabon
Angola The Gambia Burundi Malawi Sierra Leone Swaziland
Benin Rwanda CAR Mali Somalia 5
Botswana South Africa Cote d'Ivoire Mauritania Sao Tome and Principe Equatorial Guinea
Cameroon Senegal Ghana Mauritius Sudan Eritrea
Cape Verde Tunisia Guinea Bissau Morocco Tanzania Ethiopia
Comoros Uganda Guinea Mozambique Togo
Table 3: Four Currency Groups
Table 4: Five Currency Groups
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1 Egypt Mozambique Togo Guinea Bissau Angola
Liberia The Gambia Namibia Tunisia Lesotho Benin
2 Ghana Niger Uganda Libya Botswana
Algeria Guinea South Africa Zambia 4 Cameroon
Burkina Faso Kenya Senegal Zanzibar Eritrea Cape Verde
Burundi Madagascar Seychelles 3 Ethiopia Congo
CAR Malawi Somalia Mauritius 5 DRC
Cote d'Ivoire Mali Sao Tome and Principe Nigeria Chad Equatorial Guinea
Comoros Mauritania Sudan Sierra Leone Gabon Rwanda
Djibouti Morocco Tanzania Swaziland 6 Zimbabwe
1 Gabon Benin South Africa Cote d'Ivoire Morocco Zanzibar
Liberia Swaziland Botswana Senegal Ghana Mozambique
2 5 Cameroon Tunisia Guinea Namibia
Equatorial Guinea Guinea Bissau Cape Verde Uganda Kenya Niger
Rwanda Libya Comoros Zambia Lesotho Seychelles
3 Nigeria Congo Zimbabwe Madagascar Somalia
Eritrea Sierra Leone Djibouti 7 Malawi Sao Tome and Principe
Ethiopia 6 DRC Burkina Faso Mali Sudan
4 Algeria Egypt Burundi Mauritania Tanzania
Chad Angola The Gambia CAR Mauritius Togo
Table 5: Six Currency Groups
Table 6: Seven Currency Groups
1 5 DRC Libya The Gambia Sudan
Liberia Sierra Leone Egypt Madagascar Guinea Bissau Swaziland
2 6 South Africa Malawi Guinea Tanzania
Eritrea Algeria Zimbabwe Mozambique Mali Tunisia
Ethiopia Angola 7 Niger Mauritania Uganda
3 Benin Burkina Faso Seychelles Mauritius Zambia
Equatorial Guinea Botswana CAR Sao Tome and Principe Morocco Zanzibar
Rwanda Cameroon Cote d'Ivoire Togo Namibia
4 Cape Verde Ghana 8 Nigeria
Chad Comoros Kenya Burundi Senegal
Gabon Congo Lesotho Djibouti Somalia
1 5 Guinea Swaziland Cape Verde CAR Seychelles
Liberia Chad Mali Tanzania Comoros Cote d'Ivoire Sao Tome 
2 Gabon Mauritania Uganda Congo Ghana Togo
Sierra Leone 6 Mauritius Zambia Egypt Kenya
3 Angola Morocco Zanzibar The Gambia Lesotho
Equatorial Guinea DRC Namibia 8 South Africa Libya
Rwanda 7 Nigeria Algeria Tunisia Madagascar
4 Burundi Senegal Benin Zimbabwe Malawi
Eritrea Djibouti Somalia Botswana 9 Mozambique
Ethiopia Guinea Bissau Sudan Cameroon Burkina Faso Niger
Table 7: Eight Currency Groups
Table 8: Nine Currency Groups
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APPENDIX B: GHOSH-WOLF (1994) MODEL 
Output for country   at time t: 
  
  (  
 )    
 
          (1) 
Marginal Revenue Product for Labour: 
       
    
 
   
    
  (  
 )      
 
       (2) 
Under Perfection Competition: 
  
          
  (  
 )      
 
       
 (3) 
Taking Logarithms and rearranging: 
     
       
       (   )     
    
      
 (4) 
Assumed wage-setting equation at time t-1 (assuming labour market equilibrium) is: 
     
           
       (   )    ̅        
     
 (5) 
Assuming wage rigidity (i.e. not flexible downwards) a negative shock (i.e.   
        
 ) 
causes the quantity of labour demanded at time t to deviate from full employment level 
and thus satisfy the following equation: 
     
       
       (   )     
    
      
 (6) 
Making      
  the subject of the formula in (5), substituting into (6) and rearranging 
gives: 
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  (   )    (  
  ̅⁄ )    
 (7) 
To maintain full employment [i.e.   
   ̅     (  
  ̅⁄ )     ( )   ] we have that: 
         
       
     
        
     
       (8) 
To maintain full employment in the country the currency must depreciate by a margin 
that is commensurate with the size of the shock experienced to cut real wages. When a 
shock occurs with an asymmetric impact on two countries,   and  , in a monetary union 
the depreciation required for   is different from that required for   to ensure full 
adjustment and maintenance of full employment in each individual country i.e.   
    
 
. 
The common monetary authority strikes a balance by depreciating the common currency 
by a margin that lies somewhere between the magnitudes of the two individual shock 
impacts   
  and   
 
. This can be done by taking a GDP-weighted average of the two shock 
impacts   ̅. The cost of monetary unions in this regard lies in the fact that the measure 
taken to depreciate the common currency will be insufficient for the country with the 
high shock impact and excessive for the country with the low shock impact. 
The depreciation of the common currency   ̅ is given by: 
         
       
      ̅        (9) 
The individual shock impact is still given by: 
   
        
     
                        (10) 
Substituting (9) and (10) into (7) and rearranging gives the labour demand after the 
depreciation of the common currency by the regional central bank: 
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   ̅ (  
   ̅ ) (   )⁄          (11) 
Outside of the monetary union country   would attain reach full-employment level 
because it can depreciate to the full extent of the country-specific shock impact so its 
output would be given by: 
  
     
 
( ̅)           (12) 
We can obtain the output for country   in a monetary union using result (11) as follows: 
 ̂ 
     
 
(  
 )     
 
( ̅ (  
   ̅ ) (   )⁄ )
 
    
 
( ̅)    (  
   ̅ ) (   )⁄    
   (  
   ̅ ) (   )⁄        
(13) 
Thus the output loss suffered as a result of being in the monetary union is calculated as 
the difference: 
  
    
   ̂ 
    
    
   (  
   ̅ ) (   )⁄    
 (  (  
   ̅ ) (   )⁄ )   (14) 
If   
    ̅ 
The total cost of forming the currency unions is given by: 
  ∑   
  
               (15) 
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APPENDIX C: MATLAB CODE 
whileloopfn 
function [xopt] = whileloopfn(num,k,lim,data,carry) 
% 
%WHILELOOPFN runs the genetic algorithm a specified number of times for 
a 
%specified number of countries,currency groups, dataset and initial 
vector 
%  
% Syntax: 
% 
% [xopt] = whileloopfn(num,k,lim,data,carry) 
% 
% Description: 
%  
% runs the genetic algorithm a specified number of times for a 
% specified number of countries,currency groups, dataset and initial 
vector 
%  
% Input Arguments: 
% 
% num - the total number of countries in the group under investigation 
% 
% k - number of currency groups 
% 
% lim - the number of times that an optimal vector of allocations must 
% remain unchanged before the algorithm terminates 
% 
% data - the data. Annual time series logGDP data. 
%  
% carry = the starting vector for the algorithm. It can be used for 
% continuity so that a previously discovered optimal vector is included 
in 
% the new initial population. at the beginning it is specified as a one 
% currency union arrangement i.e. all ones 
% 
% Output Arguments: 
% 
% xopt  = the best vector for the parameters set. 
% 
% 
% we begin by initializing the counting index that will halt the loop 
when 
% it exceed lim 
index=0; 
% 
% we execute the beginfn function that creates a population of 26 
candidate 
% vector solutions of size (1x26) 
[pop]=beginfn(num,k,carry); 
% 
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while index<lim 
% the for loop below calculates the loss value of each candidate vector 
and 
% assigns that value to the last column 
    for t=1:26 
        x=pop(t,1:num+1); 
        [pop(t,num+1)]=fitnessfn(x,k,data); 
    end 
% 
% the candidate vectors are arranged by theirl loss values with the 
best  
% vector (i.e. the one with the lowest loss) at the bottom     
    popranked=sortrows(pop,num+1); 
% 
% we assign the best vector for the current generation to xopt to save 
it.  
    xopt=popranked(26,:); 
% we generate a vector of the distinct groups in the optimal vector     
    check = unique(popranked(26,1:num)); 
% we check the size of this vector because we want to ensure that the  
% number of unions is actually equal to k instead of some smaller 
number     
    dim = size(check); 
% the if loop below ensures that the current best vector only replaces 
the 
% running best vector if it has a better fitness values and has the 
right  
% number of groups     
    if (popranked(26,num+1)>xopt(num+1))&&dim(2)==k 
        xopt=popranked(26,:); index=0; 
% if the running best vector is unchanged, the index increases to 
signify  
% that the running best survived another population         
    else index=index+1; 
    end 
% the for loop below rearranges the rows of the population matrix to 
put  
% the best vectors on top.     
    for t=1:26 
    descendranked(t,:)=popranked(27-t,:); 
    end 
% the for loop below recalibrates the fitness values as positive 
numbers  
% so that we can implement probabilistic selection of each vector into 
the 
% next generation depending on the loss value  
    for t=1:26 
    descendranked(t,num+1)=1000+descendranked(t,num+1); 
    end 
% we run the selection operator     
    pop=roulettefn(descendranked,k,num); 
% we run the crossover operator     
    for t=1:2:25 
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        x1=pop(t,1:num+1); 
        x2=pop(t+1,1:num+1); 
        [pop(t,1:num+1),pop(t+1,1:num+1)]=crossfn(x1,x2,0.99,num); 
    end 
% we run the mutation operator     
    for t=1:26 
        x3=pop(t,1:num+1); 
        pop(t,1:num+1)=mutatefn(x3,0.99,k,num); 
    end 
% we include the running best vector as a member of the next generation 
of 
% candidate solution vectors. 
    pop(26,:)=xopt; 
end 
 
beginfn 
function [pop]=beginfn(num,k,carryvect) 
%BEGINFN Creates the initial population of candidate row vectors 
randomly 
%  
% Syntax: 
% 
% [pop]=beginfn(num,k,carryvect) 
% 
% Description: 
%  
% Creates the initial population of candidate row vectors randomly 
%  
% Input Arguments: 
% 
% carryvect - the starting vector for the algorithm. It can be used for 
% continuity so that a previously discovered optimal vector is included 
in 
% the new initial population. at the beginning it is specified as a one 
% currency union arrangement i.e. all ones 
% 
% k - number of currency groups 
% 
% num - the total number of countries in the group under investigation 
% 
% Output Arguments: 
% 
% pop - initial population of candidate row vectors randomly generated 
pop = round(rand(25,num+1)*(k-1))+ones(25,num+1); 
pop = [pop; carryvect]; 
end 
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fitnessfn 
function [loss, count] = fitnessfn(x,r,data) 
%FITNESSFN Calculates the fitness of a (1x54) vector of currency groups 
%allocations 
%  
% Syntax: 
% 
% [loss, count] = fitnessfn(x,r,data) 
% 
% Description: 
%  
% Calculates the fitness of a (1x54) vector of currency groups 
% allocation 
%  
% Input Arguments: 
% 
% x - a (1x54) vector of currency groups allocations 
% 
% r - number of currency groups 
% 
% data - the data. Annual time series logGDP data. 
% 
% Output Arguments: 
% 
% loss - output loss of the currency group allocation vector 
% 
% count - this is the actual number of currency groups implied by the 
% vector. It can happen that a randomly generated vector has fewer 
currency 
% groups than specified in beginfn. We use this index to ensure that 
the 
% vector has the required number of groups. 
loss = 0; 
count = 0; 
for m = 1:r 
    Mat_m = []; 
    for n = 1:54 
        if x(n) == m 
            Mat_m = [Mat_m data(:,n)]; 
            map(n) = 1; 
        else 
            Mat_m = Mat_m; 
            map(n) = 0; 
        end 
    end 
    check = isempty(Mat_m); 
    if  check == 0 
        count = count + 1; 
        [T_m C_m] = hpfilter(Mat_m, 100); 
        Err_m = C_m; 
        Mrow_tots = sum(Mat_m, 2); 
        Pr_m = Mat_m.*Err_m; 
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        Prrow_tots = sum(Pr_m,2); 
        w_Err_m = Prrow_tots./Mrow_tots; 
        row_col = size(Mat_m); 
        col = row_col(2); 
        err_diff_m = Err_m - repmat(w_Err_m,1,col); 
        Ones_m = ones(40,col); 
        Exp_m = exp(err_diff_m*2); 
        Temp_m = Ones_m - Exp_m; 
        loss_m = sum(sum(Mat_m.*Temp_m)); 
        loss = loss + loss_m; 
        check = 1; 
    end 
end 
end 
 
roulettefn 
function [newpop] = roulettefn(oldpop,u,num) 
%ROULETTEFN For proportional selection of candidate solutions based on 
%fitness value 
%  
% Syntax: 
% 
% [newpop] = roulettefn(oldpop,u,num) 
% 
% Description: 
%  
% Selects each member of the old population into the new population 
with a 
% probability directly proportional to its fitness value. It adds new 
% randomly created solutions to the selected ones from the old 
populations 
% to maintain a constant population size 
%  
% Input Arguments: 
% 
% oldpop - a matrix made up of 26 candidate solutions as row vectors 
% 
% u - number of currency groups 
% 
% num - the total number of countries in the group under investigation 
% 
% Output Arguments: 
% 
% newpop - a new matrix made up of 26 candidate row vectors. Some of 
the 
% vectors are the fitter ones from oldpop and the rest are randomly 
% generated ones. 
  
  
%we begin by calculating the total fitness of all the candidates in 
oldpop 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
 56 
%after crossover and mutation have been implemented. 
totalfit = sum(oldpop(:,num+1)); 
  
%calculate each candidate's fitness as a fraction of the total fitness 
prob = oldpop(:,num+1)/totalfit; 
  
%obtain the cumulative probabilities of the candidates in the 
population 
prob = cumsum(prob); 
  
%create a vector with randomly generated elements and sort them. we 
will 
%use this vector to filter in candidates that make it into the new 
%population 
rns = sort(rand(26,1)); 
  
%now for the loop that implements the roulette wheel selection 
fitin = 1; %index for the oldpop 
newin = 1; %index for the newpop 
newpop = []; % create empty newpop 
for t = 1:26 
    if (rns(newin) < prob(fitin)) 
    newpop(newin,:) = oldpop(fitin,:); 
    newin = newin + 1; 
    else 
    fitin = fitin + 1; 
    end 
end 
%we need to generate more candidate solution vectors to fill out the 
extra 
%rows where those from oldpop did not get selected 
  
%count the number of rows in newpop 
a = size(newpop); 
rows = a(1); 
  
%create a matrix of size 
popsize = size(oldpop,1); 
append = round(ones(popsize-rows,num+1)+ rand(popsize-rows, num+1)*(u-
1)); 
  
%form the new population by combining the selected rows of oldpop with 
the 
%newly generated matrix 
newpop = [newpop; append]; 
end 
 
crossfn 
function [chi1, chi2] = crossfn(par1, par2, pc,num) 
%CROSSFN takes in two adjacent candidate vectors as parent1 and 
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%parent2 from the matrix pop and produces two new candidate vectors, 
child1 
%and child2 that are either different from the parents with probability 
pc 
%or identical to them with probability (1-pc) 
%  
% Syntax: 
% 
% [chi1, chi2] = crossfn(par1, par2, pc,num) 
% 
% Description: 
%  
% this function takes in two adjacent candidate vectors as parent1 and 
% parent2 from the matrix pop and produces two new candidate vectors, 
child1 
% and child2 that are either different from the parents with 
probability pc 
% or identical to them with probability (1-pc) 
%  
% Input Arguments: 
% 
% par1 - a (1x55) candidate row vector 
% 
% par2 -  a (1x55) candidate row vector adjacent to par1 
% 
% num - the total number of countries in the group under investigation 
% 
% pc - probability of cross-over 
% 
% Output Arguments: 
% 
% chi1 - a (1x55) candidate row vector created from par1 and par2 by 
% exchanging portions or it is the same as par1 
% 
% chi2 - a (1x55) candidate row vector created from par1 and par2 by 
% exchanging portions or it is the same as par2  
% 
  
  
if (rand < pc) 
  
%randomly generating a cutoff point 
cpoint = round(rand*num)+1; 
  
%swapping portions of parent1 and parent2 to make child1 and child2 
chi1 = [par1(:,1:cpoint) par2(:,cpoint+1:num+1)]; 
chi2 = [par2(:,1:cpoint) par1(:,cpoint+1:num+1)]; 
  
else 
chi1 = par1; 
chi2 = par2; 
end 
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end 
 
mutatefn 
function [child] = mutatefn(parent, pm, w,num) 
%MUTATEFN mutatefn switches the currency union of one country in the  
%vector of allocations to another randomly chosen one with probability 
pm 
%  
% Syntax: 
% 
% [child] = mutatefn(parent, pm, w,num) 
% 
% Description: 
%  
% switches the currency union of one country in the vector parent  
% to another randomly chosen one with probability pm 
%  
% Input Arguments: 
% 
% parent - a (1x55) row vector of currency group allocations for 54 
% countries and the corresponding fitness value 
% 
% pm - probability of mutation 
%  
% w - number of currency groups 
% 
% num - the total number of countries in the group under investigation 
% 
% Output Arguments: 
% 
% child - a new (1x55) row vector after mutation (possibly unchanged) 
  
if (rand < pm) 
    mpoint = round(rand*num)+1; 
    child = parent; 
    child(mpoint) = round(rand*(w-1))+1; 
else 
    child = parent;  
end 
end 
 
decipherfn 
function [africa] = decipherfn(optimal,j) 
%DECIPHERFN displays the currency group members for a given (1x55) 
%candidate row vector 
%  
% Syntax: 
% 
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% [africa] = decipherfn(optimal,j) 
% 
% Description: 
%  
% displays the currency group members for a given (1x55) 
% candidate row vector 
%  
% Input Arguments: 
% 
% optimal - a (1x55) candidate row vector 
% 
% j - number of currency groups. j is the number of currency unions as  
% given by count (not by k because the one specified may differ from 
the  
% one that actually results from the random generation of the pop 
matrix 
% 
% Output Arguments: 
% 
% africa - the names of countries grouped in their respective currency 
% groups 
  
countries = ['dza'; 'ago';  'ben';  'bwa';  'bfa';  'bdi';  'cmr';  
'cpv';  'caf';  'tcd';  'civ';  'com';  'cog';  'dji';  'zar';  'egy';  
'gnq';  'eri';  'eth';  'gab';  'gmb';  'gha';  'gnb';  'gin';  'ken';  
'lso';  'lbr';  'lby';  'mdg';  'mwi';  'mli';  'mrt';  'mus';  'mar';  
'moz';  'nam';  'ner';  'nga';  'rwa';  'zaf';  'sen';  'syc';  'sle';  
'som';  'stp';  'sdn';  'swz';  'tza';  'tgo';  'tun';  'uga';  'zmb';  
'znz';  'zwe']; 
africa = cell(1,j);%create a cell to save the country groups of 
different  
                   %sizes 
for m = 1:j 
union = []; %initialise vector containing names of countries in union m   
count = 0; 
  
c1 = [' ']; 
  
disp(c1); 
    for n = 1:54  
        if optimal(n) == m 
           count = count + 1; 
           union = [union; countries(n,:)];%column vector of union 
members 
        else 
        end 
    end 
    disp(union); 
    
    africa{1,m} = union; 
  
end 
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end 
contiguityfnfunction [pop] = contiguityfn(k,border) 
%UNTITLED2 Summary of this function goes here 
%   Detailed explanation goes here 
  
% create a one-group allocation vector called pop 
pop = [1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 ... 
    1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1]; 
  
% count the number of rows of pop 
dimension = size(pop); 
rows = dimension(1); 
  
% while the number of rows of pop is less that 26, execute the 
following 
while rows < 2 
     
    % initialise a candidate of zero elements 
    candidate = zeros(1,54); 
     
    % assign the numbers 1 to k in random positions in the candidate 
vector 
    for i = 1:k 
        countryposition = round(rand*53) + 1; 
        % display(countryposition); 
        if candidate(countryposition)== 0 
            candidate(countryposition) = i; 
        else 
            i = i-1; 
        end 
    end 
     
    % create vectors of the positions of the assigned and unassigned 
    % country positions. Initialise them first. 
    assigned = []; 
    unassigned = []; 
    for j = 1:54 
        if candidate(j) == 0 
            unassigned = [unassigned j]; 
        else 
            assigned = [assigned j]; 
        end 
    end 
     
    % count the number of elements in unassigned 
    dimunas = size(unassigned); 
    colsunas = dimunas(2); 
     
    % while the candidate vector still contains some unassigned 
countries 
    % perform the following 
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    while colsunas >= 1 
         
        % count the number of elements in assigned 
        dimas = size(assigned); 
        colsas = dimas(2); 
         
        % choose a random number in the range (1:no. of rows of 
assigned) 
        initial = round(rand*(colsas-1)) + 1; 
         
        % the randomly chosen, already assigned country is in position 
        % given by 
        seedcountry = assigned(initial); 
        % display(seedcountry); 
         
        % create a vector to identify the countries that are neighbours 
        % with the seedcountry by using the border matrix 
         
        % initialise the vector of neighbours 
        neighbours = []; 
         
        % go through the vector of unassigned countries to identify the 
        % neighbours of the seedcountry that are as yet unassigned 
        for l = 1:colsunas 
            tempvar = unassigned(l);             
            if (border(l,seedcountry)==1) && (candidate(tempvar)==0) 
                neighbours = [neighbours l]; 
            else 
            end 
        end 
        % display(neighbours); 
         
        % choose one of the countries in the neighbours vector randomly 
and 
        % put it in the same group as the seedcountry. Do this by 
        % generating a number in the range (1:no of cols of neighbours 
        % vector) 
         
        % count the number of elements in neighbours 
        dimne = size(neighbours); 
        colsne = dimne(2); 
         
        % choosing a random position in the neighbour vector 
        newmemberposition = round(rand*(colsne-1)) + 1; 
         
        % assign the group number to the new member of the group in the 
        % candidate vector 
        index = neighbours(newmemberposition); 
        candidate(index) = candidate(seedcountry); 
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        % identify the position in unassigned that contains the new 
member 
        % initialise the holding variable 
        eliminatecol = 0; 
        for m = 1:colsunas 
            if unassigned(m)==index 
                eliminatecol = m; 
            else 
            end             
        end 
        display(m) 
        display(eliminatecol); 
        % reduce the size of the unassigned vector by removing the 
country 
        % that was given a group 
        assigned = [assigned index]; 
        unassigned(eliminatecol) = []; 
         
        % count the number of elements in unassigned 
        dimunas = size(unassigned); 
        colsunas = dimunas(2); 
         
    end 
     
    % append the candidate vector to pop 
    pop = [pop; candidate]; 
     
end 
  
  
  
end 
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